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We investigated how information on a motive to lie impacts on the perceived content
quality of a statement and its subsequent veracity rating. In an online study, 300
participants rated a statement about an alleged sexual harassment on a scale based
on Criteria-based Content Analysis (CBCA) and judged its veracity. In a 3 × 3 between-
subjects design, we varied prior information (motive to lie, no motive to lie, and no
information on a motive), and presented three different statement versions of varying
content quality (high, medium, and low). In addition to anticipating main effects of both
independent variables (motive information and statement version), we predicted that
the impact of motive information on both ratings would be highest for medium quality
statements, because their assessment is especially ambiguous (interaction effect).
Contrary to our hypotheses, results showed that participants were unaffected by motive
information and accurately reproduced the manipulated quality differences between
statement versions in their CBCA-based judgments. In line with the expected interaction
effect, veracity ratings decreased in the motive-to-lie group compared to controls, but
only when the medium- and the low-quality statements were rated (truth ratings dropped
from approximately 80 to 50%). Veracity ratings in both the no-motive-to-lie group
and controls did not differ across statement versions (≥82% truth ratings). In sum,
information on a motive to lie thus encouraged participants to consider content quality in
their veracity judgments by being critical only of statements of medium and low quality.
Otherwise, participants judged statements to be true irrespective of content quality.
Keywords: Criteria-based Content Analysis, credibility assessment, contextual information, motive to lie, truth-
default theory, truth bias
INTRODUCTION
In the last 30 years, a growing body of research has shown that criteria-based content analysis
(CBCA; Steller and Köhnken, 1989; Volbert and Steller, 2014) validly distinguishes true from
fabricated accounts (Vrij, 2008; Amado et al., 2015, 2016; Oberlader et al., 2016). Basically, this
research suggests—in line with the so-called Undeutsch hypothesis (Undeutsch, 1967)—that true
statements differ from fabricated accounts in their content quality, with true statements generally
containing more CBCA criteria than fabricated accounts. In the field, however, the results of a
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content analysis based on CBCA are never considered in isolation
(see Akehurst et al., 2011). Instead, when evaluating a witness’s
statement, an expert in the field is inevitably confronted with
additional information from, for example, studying a case file. In
fact, statement validity assessment (SVA; Köhnken, 2004; Volbert
and Steller, 2014), in which CBCA plays a key role, even requires
the expert to actively gather more contextual information from
the case file or an interview with the witness so that it can
be considered in the final evaluation of a statement (Steller,
1989; Volbert and Steller, 2014). Even though this procedure
aims to improve the validity of an expert’s decision making,
little is known in general about the actual impact of contextual
information on the content analysis of a statement using CBCA
and veracity ratings (Bogaard et al., 2014). The current study
aimed to shed light on this issue. Specifically, we investigated the
effect of information regarding a motive to lie, because this has
received particular consideration not only within the framework
of SVA (Steller and Köhnken, 1989; Köhnken, 2004) but also in
work on everyday deception detection (Levine et al., 2010).
Contextual Information and CBCA: The
Case of a Motive to Lie
To the authors’ best knowledge, up to now, only one study
has investigated the effect of additional case information on
CBCA ratings of an abuse statement. However, it did not
focus on a specific type of information (Bogaard et al., 2014).
Instead, in one condition, it presented information about the
accused (a pertinent criminal history of the accused, child
pornography found on his computer, and a reportedly hot
temper). This was meant to increase the credibility of the
witness (“positive information condition”). The second condition
presented varying information mainly on the personality and
behavior of the witness (history of lying, rebellious behavior at
school, stealing money from her mother, and alleged motive
for revenge). This was meant to reduce the credibility of the
witness (“negative information condition”). Varying “positive”
versus “negative” information had large effects of d = 0.83 on
CBCA ratings and d = 1.1 on veracity ratings with “positive”
information leading to higher and “negative” information to
lower CBCA and veracity ratings. The authors interpreted these
results as indicating a confirmation bias resulting from contextual
information that can distort CBCA ratings.
These results led us to ask whether information indicating a
motive to lie might have a similar impact on a content analysis
based on CBCA and subsequent veracity ratings. Theoretical
frameworks such as truth-default theory (TDT; Levine, 2014)
assume that people usually believe in the truthfulness of a
statement unless they suspect that lying has a certain benefit for
the sender. Suspecting that there is a motive to lie might play a key
role in deception detection, because it increases suspicion (Levine
et al., 2010). Suspicion, in turn, has been shown to generally
diminish truth ratings because it decreases the credibility and
the perceived trustworthiness of the sender (see, e.g., Millar and
Millar, 1997). As a result, a motive to lie might be interpreted
as indicative of deception, whereas the absence of a motive to
lie might be interpreted as indicative of honest communication.
Hence, on the one hand, information that the sender has a motive
to lie might decrease a witness’s perceived credibility. Information
on a motive to lie might therefore result in lower ratings of
content quality and lower veracity judgments. On the other
hand, information suggesting that there is no motive to lie might
increase the perceived credibility of the witness, thereby resulting
in higher content quality ratings and veracity judgments.
However, the effect of contextual information should also
depend on characteristics of the statement to be judged—that
is, the content quality of the critical account—as indicated by
its CBCA scores. We assume that if the statement quality itself
is not sufficient for an informed decision, this creates a sense of
uncertainty. Uncertainty should stimulate raters to (intentionally
or unintentionally) draw on additional sources of information
and heuristics to make their decision (Tversky and Kahneman,
1974; Evans, 1989). For example, in an experimental study on
the analysis of polygraph charts, Elaad et al. (1994) found that
the effect of prior guilt expectations concerning the examined
suspect covaried with the informative value of the polygraph
results. Prior guilt expectations affected their analysis results
only if the indications they contained were ambiguous and not
clear. Therefore, in the current study, we assumed that the
influence of additional information (motive to lie) should be
relatively small on judgments of very high- or very low-quality
statements, because they should contain clear implications on
content quality and veracity. However, a judgment of a medium-
quality statement is less clear and rather ambiguous. Thus,
additional information from the case file such as indications on
a motive to lie might have a larger effect on content quality
and veracity judgments, because it might facilitate the decision-
making process. We consequently assumed that the influence of
contextual information regarding a motive to lie would be higher
when the statements to be judged are of medium content quality.
The Current Study: General Design and
Hypotheses
In the current study, we aimed to investigate how information
regarding a motive to lie would influence how laypeople
perceived content quality and rated the veracity of a statement.
We assessed content quality using a short scale based on the
CBCA taxonomy (CBCA-based rating; see below) and varied
motive information by providing participants with information
either suggesting a motive to lie or explicitly speaking against a
motive to lie. We also introduced a control group that received
no information regarding a motive to lie. Moreover, because we
assumed that the effect of a motive to lie would depend on the
content quality of the statement to be judged, we constructed
three different versions of a harassment statement with low,
medium, or high content quality as indicated by their CBCA score
(see the method section for a detailed description of the study
material). Based on the aforementioned arguments, we derived
the following five hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1
We expected that providing participants with information on a
motive to lie would impact negatively on CBCA-based ratings,
whereas information suggesting that there was no motive to
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lie would have a positive impact. We thus assumed a main
effect of information on a motive to lie on CBCA-based ratings,
with participants receiving information on a motive to lie
generally rating statement quality lower than a control group and
participants with information speaking against a motive generally
rating statement quality higher than a control group.
Hypothesis 2
We expected an interaction effect between information on a
motive to lie and the statement quality on CBCA ratings.
Specifically, we assumed that the expected differences between
the motive groups and controls (see section “Hypothesis 1”)
would be especially pronounced when judging a statement of
medium content quality.
Hypothesis 3
We predicted a main effect of the different statement versions
on veracity ratings, with veracity ratings overall reflecting the
constructed quality differences between statement versions.
Hypothesis 4
We expected that providing participants with information on a
motive to lie would impact negatively on veracity ratings, whereas
information suggesting that there is no motive to lie would have
a positive impact. We thus assumed a main effect of information
on a motive to lie on veracity ratings, with participants receiving
information on a motive to lie generally rating the statement
quality higher than controls and participants with information
speaking against a motive generally rating statement quality
lower than controls.
Hypothesis 5
We expected an interaction effect between information on a
motive to lie and the statement quality on veracity ratings.
Specifically, we assumed that the respective differences between
the motive groups and controls (see section “Hypothesis 4”)




Participants were recruited via mailing lists for mainly medicine
and psychology students from two universities. An e-mail
providing the link to the online study invited students to
participate for course credit and/or the chance to win one of three
online vouchers each worth 30 Euro. The e-mail also included
a short trigger warning that participants would have to read
a statement depicting a sexual assault, and that this might be
stressful especially to victims of sexual violence. Out of 361
participants who followed the link contained in the mail, 314
completed the whole questionnaire. Six participants with extreme
processing times (less than 140 s and more than 1,800 s) on the
study pages (excluding pages containing general information at
the beginning and both the debriefing and prize draw after the
study) were identified and excluded from the data set. Finally,
another eight participants were excluded because they had
indicated not speaking German on a mother-tongue level. The
remaining 300 participants took an average of 386 s (SD = 168) to
complete the study, were predominantly female (81.7%), and had
an average age of 23.2 years (SD = 4.8 years). Virtually all of them
(97%) were university students (65% psychology; others were
medicine, mathematics, medical engineering, nutrition science,
and molecular life science).
Design and Procedure
We conducted an online study using the platform soscisurvey.de.
Motive information (motive to lie, no motive to lie, no
information) and statement version based on its content quality
(low, medium, and high) were varied between participants. This
resulted in a 3 × 3 between-subject study design.
Procedure
Participants who clicked the link in the e-mail (see above)
were referred to the first page of the study on soscisurvey.de
and randomly assigned to one of the 3 (motive condition)
×3 (statement version) conditions. Conditions are described in
more detail below.
On the first page, all participants found another, yet more
detailed trigger warning along with a data protection and privacy
statement according to the guidelines of the two universities from
which they had been recruited. Subsequently, participants were
asked for demographic information. Next, they were all told that
they would be presented with a statement by Ms. K. who accused
her coworker Mr. H. of having attempted to sexually assault her.
Participants assigned to the “motive-to-lie” or “no-motive-to-lie”
condition were then provided with more contextual information
(see below). Subsequently, all participants were told that their
task was to carefully read the statement on the incident provided
by Ms. K. before going on to rate it according to given criteria
(see Appendix 1 for a more detailed description of the criteria).
After they had finished reading the statement in their assigned
condition and had moved on to the rating task, participants
were free to go back to the statement anytime and as often
as they deemed necessary. The rating task was followed by the
manipulation check (see below) before participants were thanked
for taking part in the study and provided with information on
how to gain a course credit and participate in the online voucher
lottery in return for their participation.
Power Analysis
Using the software G∗Power (v. 3.1.9.2; Faul et al., 2007), we ran
an a priori power analysis to calculate the sample size needed for
the current study (F tests; ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, main
effects, and interactions). As reported above, Bogaard et al. (2014)
had found that more general contextual information had a large
effect on CBCA ratings. However, because we were not planning
a rater training but introduce a new CBCA-based measure (see
below) as well as an additional independent variable (different
quality versions of the statement), we anticipated a lower—that is,
a medium effect size. G∗Power estimated that we needed a total
sample size of N = 270 to detect a medium effect size (f = 0.25)
with 80% power and a type-1 error probability of 5%. Because
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there might be multiple reasons for excluding participants
especially in an online study (e.g., incomplete questionnaires,
insufficient language skills, extremely long, or short processing
duration), we decided to aim for an N∼330 in the raw data to be




Motive information was varied on three levels: a “negative”
motive-to-lie condition, a “positive” no-motive-to-lie condition,
and a control condition.
In the motive-to-lie condition, participants were provided
with information designed to suggest a motive to lie on the part
of Ms. K. Specifically, it said that Mr. H. denied all accusations.
He claimed to have no private contact with her, and that the
had never gone to see her in her office after work. Participants
were also told that Mr. H. assumed that Ms. K. was seeking
revenge because he had recently been promoted instead of her.
Furthermore, it was said that another coworker had told the
police that 2 days before the alleged incident, Mr. H. and Ms. K.
had been arguing, and that Ms. K. had left the office of Mr. H.,
shouting that he would see where all this will get him.
In the no-motive-to-lie condition, participants were provided
with information designed to suggest that Ms. K. had no plausible
motive to lie. Specifically, participants were told that Ms. K. and
Mr. H. had been working together without incident and had
neither been very close nor had had any major arguments or
conflicts. It was also said that Ms. K. had recently been promoted.
Furthermore, according to a coworker of Ms. K. and Mr. H., a
meeting 2 days before the alleged incident had gone smoothly,
and there was generally a harmonious and constructive working
atmosphere in the office unit.
Finally, a control condition provided no contextual
information at all on a possible motive to lie. Participants
were informed only that Ms. K. is accusing her coworker of an
attempted sexual assault.
Statement Versions Based on Their Content Quality
Having read the contextual information on a possible motive to
lie, participants were presented with the statement by Ms. K. We
developed three different statement versions containing a low, a
medium, or a high content quality as indicated by their CBCA
score. Statements were varied between participants. They were
developed in the following way:
First, we composed an extensive statement by Ms. K. that read
as if it was transcribed word for word. She said essentially that
one day, she was alone in her office after hours when Mr. H. came
knocking on her office door asking to be let in. After unlocking
the door to let him in, she turned to tidy up some lunch dishes
from the table. This was when Mr. H. grabbed her arm, pulled
her around, and tried to kiss her. Turning her head and pushing
him away from her, she asked him what he was doing. When she
turned around and asked him to leave, he again approached her
1All study materials both in German and in English can be retrieved online at
https://osf.io/h564u.
from behind, put his arms around her, and touched her. When
she finally managed to escape his arms, she opened her office door
and again asked him to leave. At first, he did not, but started to
try and calm her down. She then threatened to call the police and
this made him leave the office. He then finally tried to explain
and apologize to her, but she could not really respond to this.
Instead, she closed the door in his face and locked it, which
finally made him leave.
In the high-quality version, the statement was systematically
enriched with various CBCA criteria generally characterizing
episodic autobiographical memory such as emotions/feelings,
thoughts, verbal reproductions, or perpetrator’s mental state
(Steller and Köhnken, 1989). Moreover, in line with current
classifications (Volbert and Steller, 2014; Volbert, 2015), we
augmented the statement with CBCA criteria describing script-
deviant and/or script-irrelevant details such as complications or
unusual/peripheral details; CBCA criteria describing memory-
related shortcomings such as spontaneous corrections, admitting
lack of memory, or efforts to remember; and finally, CBCA
criteria indicating a lack of strategic self-presentation such as self-
deprecation or pardoning the perpetrator. This initial statement
contained 992 words.
For the medium-quality version, CBCA criteria were deleted
systematically from the initial statement. From all four categories
depicted above, at least one criterion was removed so that not
only the overall CBCA score but also the score within each
category was lower than in the initial statement. This version
contained 528 words.
Likewise, we deleted criteria systematically from the medium-
quality version to again reduce the CBCA score. The resulting
low-quality version finally contained 297 words. Both medium-




The current sample of laypersons was unfamiliar with CBCA.
In many comparable studies, participants first underwent a
short introduction to CBCA to prepare them for the rating
task (see, e.g., Bogaard et al., 2014). We chose a different
approach and developed a short rating scale based on the
CBCA criteria (Steller and Köhnken, 1989; Volbert and Steller,
2014) addressing the psychological processes assumed to underlie
CBCA criteria—namely, episodic memory processes, script
deviation, and absence of strategic self-presentation (Volbert
and Steller, 2014; Volbert, 2015). This approach allowed us to
restrict the number of items and to develop CBCA wordings
that laypersons would be able to comprehend because they
explained the idea behind groups of criteria instead of providing
many strict and abstract definitions. Overall, we constructed
five CBCA-based items: “quantity of details,” “vividness,” “script
deviance,” “memory-related shortcomings,” and “incrimination.”
Each was rated on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 to 5 with
varying pole terms. More information on scale construction and
item wordings can be found in the appendix. It is important
to note that the CBCA-based rating scale was designed as a
measure to assess the perceived qualitative differences between
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the statement versions. We do not claim that it can distinguish
validly between experience-based and false statements as has been
shown for the original CBCA compilation, because this was not
the purpose of our study.
Veracity rating
Participants were asked to rate whether they considered Ms. K.’s
statement to be true or fabricated on a 4-point scale ranging from
1 (fabricated) to 4 (true).
Manipulation check
Having completed the CBCA-based rating task and the veracity
rating, participants were asked to rate whether—on the basis of
the contextual information provided—Ms. K. might have had a
motive to falsely accuse Mr. H. on a 5-point scale ranging from
−2 (contextual information clearly suggested a motive for a false
accusation) to +2 (contextual information spoke against a motive
for a false accusation) with a midpoint 0 (there was no relevant
contextual information).
Data Analysis2
All calculations were run with the statistical software “RStudio”
(v. 1.1.383; RStudio Team, 2019) implemented in “R” (v. 3.4.1; R
Core Team, 2019)3. Type-1 error was set at 5% for all analyses.
We computed two-way ANOVAs to test our hypotheses. We
used Tukey’s HSD for post hoc comparisons since we intended
to control for type-I error inflation without losing too much
test power. “Incrimination” was reversed before being used in
the calculations. The score derived from the five CBCA-based
items had a comparably low Cronbach’s α = 0.65, 95% CI
(0.59, 0.72), across all conditions4. However, we measured a
broad construct and intended to use the scale only for group
statistics, not individual assessments. Thus, considering the low
number of items and following recent recommendations for short
scale constructions (Ziegler et al., 2014), we deemed the Alpha
acceptable. We computed total CBCA-based rating scores based




We computed a two-way ANOVA5 with motive information
and statements’ content quality as between-subject factors and
2The data and the R code used to analyze the data can be found under the following
link: https://osf.io/h564u.
3Data were imported using the package “haven” (Wickham and Miller, 2019).
“plyr” (Wickham, 2011) was used to name, define, and recode variables. “car” (Fox
and Weisberg, 2019) was used for all ANOVA calculations, “DescTools” (Signorell,
2019) was used to calculate post hoc tests and effect sizes, and “MBESS” (Kelley,
2019) to calculate confidence intervals around effect sizes. All figures were created
with “ggplot2” (Wickham, 2016).
4Internal consistency of the CBCA-based ratings was computed using the R
package “psych” (Revelle, 2018).
5We did not test for either normality or equality of variances in all ANOVAs,
because given appropriate sample size, results of ANOVAs are considered to be
robust against violations of these assumptions (Box, 1953; Ito, 1980; Schmider
et al., 2010; Mircioiu and Atkinson, 2017).
TABLE 1 | Means and standard deviations of CBCA-based ratings (total score)











High quality 20.41 (2.36) 19.88 (2.64) 19.38 (3.14) 19.89 (2.74)
Medium
quality
17.24 (3.04) 18.24 (2.41) 19.27 (2.59) 18.24 (2.80)
Low quality 15.29 (3.01) 16.26 (2.67) 16.56 (2.34) 16.05 (2.72)
Mean (SD)2 17.72 (3.50) 18.11 (3.96) 18.43 (3.00)
Numbers refer to the sum score of all five items. Standard deviations in
parentheses. After alpha adjustment for multiple testing (α = 0.05, Tukey’s
HSD test), post hoc tests showed no statistically significant difference between
motive ininformation conditions. 1Refers to means and SDs across all motive
manipulations. 2Refers to means and SDs across all statement versions.
the manipulation check item as the dependent variable (“Might
Ms. K. have had a motive to falsely accuse Mr. H.?”). This
revealed a large main effect for the motive-to-lie group, F(2,
291) = 72.02, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.33, and 95% CI (0.24, 0.40).
Pairwise post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that this effect
was driven by the difference between the motive-to-lie group
(M = -0.78, SD = 0.92) and both the no-motive-to-lie group
[M = 0.53, SD = 0.84, d = 1.47, and 95% CI (1.16, 1.78)] and
controls [M = 0.31, SD = 0.64, d = 1.37, 95% CI (1.06, 1.68),
all ps < 0.001]. The difference between controls and the no-
motive-to-lie group did not reach statistical significance despite
yielding a moderate effect size [d = 0.29, 95% CI (0.01, 0.56), and
p = 0.15]. Therefore, we cannot rule out the possibility that the
manipulation did not work for some members of the no-motive-
to-lie group. However, the missing difference between the no-
motive-to-lie group and controls was presumably driven by the
fact that the latter judged the contextual information as tending
to dismiss a motive to lie. Because controls had received hardly
any contextual information at all and were thus expected to rate
the item mainly with “0” (“There was no relevant contextual
information”), this finding was unexpected. Yet, it seemed to
fit quite well into the theoretical framework of “truth-default
theory” (TDT; see the discussion for a more detailed elaboration).
We thus decided to continue with the planned analyses for all
subgroups, because we deemed it interesting from an exploratory,
theoretical perspective.
Statement Versions
A two-way ANOVA with motive information and statement
version as between-subjects factors revealed a large main
effect of statement version on CBCA-based ratings, F(2,
291) = 50.87, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.26, and 95% CI (0.17, 0.33),
with all differences between statements with high, medium,
and low content quality taking the expected direction (for
mean values, see Table 1). There was a large difference
between high- and low-quality statements [d = 1.41, 95% CI
(1.1, 1.72), and p < 0.001], a medium difference between
high- and medium-quality statements [d = 0.60, 95% CI
(0.32, 0.88), and p < 0.001], and a large difference between
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medium- and low-quality statements [d = 0.80, 95% CI
(0.50, 1.09), and p < 0.01]. Hence, participants successfully
differentiated the content quality of the three statement
versions with the newly developed CBCA-based rating scale.
This shows that the statement version manipulation was
successful, and speaks for the criterion-related validity of
the newly developed CBCA-based scale as a measure of
content quality.
CBCA-Based Ratings: Main Effect of
Motive Information (Hypothesis 1), and
Interaction Effect (Hypothesis 2)
Contrary to our assumptions, in a two-way ANOVA with
motive information and statement version as between-subjects
factors, the varying information on a motive to lie had no
statistically significant main effect on CBCA-based ratings,
F(2, 291) = 1.99, p = 0.14, ηp2 = 0.01, and 95% CI (0,
0.05). Nonetheless, there was a small interaction effect between
both independent variables on the CBCA-based ratings, F(4,
291) = 2.99, p = 0.02; ηp2 = 0.04, and 95% CI (0.001,
0.08). As Figure 1 shows, there was a crossover interaction
effect between statements of high and medium quality in all
motive groups. A closer inspection of the graph reveals that
the ratings of both motive groups were lower for statements
of medium than for statements of high quality. This is in
line with the main effect of statement version on CBCA-
based ratings (see above). On the other hand, ratings of
the control group hardly differed between both statement
versions. The figure suggests that this unexpected finding
mainly drove the crossover interaction effect we found. Also,
adjusted post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests revealed no significant
differences of CBCA-based ratings between controls and
either of the two experimental groups (0.15 ≤ ps ≤ 0.94;
0.17 ≤ ds ≤ 0.72). Hence, overall, the current data did
not corroborate the expected interaction between motive
information and statement quality.
FIGURE 1 | CBCA-based ratings (total scores of all five items) for the motive
manipulation and the statements’ CBCA score. Error bars are 95%
confidence intervals.
Veracity Ratings: Main Effect of
Statement Version (Hypothesis 3), Main
Effect of Motive Information (Hypothesis
4), and Interaction Effect (Hypothesis 5)
In line with Hypotheses 3 and 4, a two-way ANOVA with motive
information and statement version as between-subject factors
showed a small main effect of statement version, F(2, 291) = 7.65,
p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.05, 95% CI (0.01, 0.10), and a medium
main effect of motive information, F(2, 291) = 13.87, p < 0.001;
ηp
2 = 0.08, and 95% CI (0.03, 0.15). There was also a small
interaction effect, F(4, 291) = 2.62, p = 0.03, ηp2 = 0.03, and 95%
CI (0, 0.07) (see Table 2 for means and standard deviations for all
groups as well as Figure 2 for a graphical display).
Adjusted post hoc Tukey’s HSD tests revealed that veracity
ratings of the three motive groups showed no differences
when high-quality statements were judged (0.85 ≤ ps ≤ 1.0;
0.07 ≤ ds ≤ 0.47). When medium-quality statements were judged,
participants with information on a motive to lie rated statements
as significantly less truthful than controls [p = 0.01, d = 0.79, and
95% CI (0.29, 1.29)], whereas there was no difference in veracity
ratings between the no-motive-to-lie group and controls [p = 1.0,
d = 0.08, and 95% CI (−0.40, 0.56)]. A similar pattern was
revealed when low CBCA-score statements were rated: Whereas
veracity ratings of participants with information suggesting a
motive to lie were significantly lower than those of controls
[p = 0.003, d = 0.93, and 95% CI (0.41, 1.45)] and approached the
midpoint of the scale, there was no difference between controls
and the no-motive-to-lie group [p = 0.80, d = 0.36, and 95% CI
(−0.12, 0.85)]. Notably, it was particularly the veracity ratings of
controls that hardly changed at all across all statement versions
and remained in the upper part (i.e., the truth range) of the scale
(3.38 ≤ Ms ≤ 3.42, all ps∼1.0, 0.01 ≤ ds ≤ 0.06).
Thus, we found the predicted main effect of motive
information on veracity ratings, but could not interpret it due
to the type of interaction. As predicted, motive information
decreased veracity ratings, but only when judging medium-
and low-quality versions of the statement. We did not find
TABLE 2 | Means and standard deviations of veracity ratings per motive











High quality 3.32 (0.77) 3.65 (0.60) 3.38 (0.85) 3.45 (0.75)
Medium
quality
2.65* (1.10) 3.48 (0.67) 3.42 (0.87) 3.18 (0.97)
Low quality 2.48* (1.06) 3.03 (1.07) 3.38 (0.83) 2.97 (1.05)
Mean (SD)2 2.83 (1.04) 3.38 (0.84) 3.40 (0.84)
Standard deviations in parentheses. Scale: 1 = Fabricated; 2 = Rather fabricated;
3 = Rather true; 4 = True. 1Means and SDs across all three motive information
levels. 2Means and SDs across all statement versions. *Statistically significant
difference to controls after alpha adjustment for multiple testing (α = 0.05,
Tukey’s HSD test).
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FIGURE 2 | Veracity ratings (1 = fabricated to 4 = true) for the motive
manipulation and the statements’ CBCA score. The dotted vertical line
represents the empirical midpoint. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
TABLE 3 | Absolute frequencies of dichotomized veracity ratings per motive
information and statement version.
Motive information Statement version Truth Lie Truth rate
Motive-to-lie High quality 30 4 88%
Medium quality 20 14 59%
Low quality 16 15 52%
No- motive-to-lie High quality 32 2 94%
Medium quality 30 3 91%
Low quality 26 9 74%
Control group High quality 28 6 82%
Medium quality 29 4 88%
Low quality 27 5 84%
Truth and lie judgments were originally made on a 4-point rating scale with
1 = Fabricated; 2 = Rather fabricated; 3 = Rather true; 4 = True. Ratings of 1
and 2 were summarized to “lie”; ratings of 3 and 4 were summarized to “truth.”
the corresponding effect for the no-motive-to-lie group. In
conclusion, our hypotheses were confirmed only for the motive-
to-lie group.
Table 3 illustrates the veracity ratings split into truth and
lie judgments (3 = Rather true and 4 = True were summarized
to true judgments, 1 = Fabricated and 2 = Rather fabricated
were summarized to lie judgments). Whereas controls rated
statements as true in more than 80% of cases, the ratings by
participants in the motive-to-lie group dropped from 88% truth
judgments when judging high CBCA score statements to just
above 50% truth judgments when judging medium and low
CBCA score statements.
Did Participants Include Their
CBCA-Based Ratings in Their Veracity
Judgments?
Finally, we checked whether participants had followed the logic
of CBCA and based their veracity judgments on their previous
CBCA ratings. We included CBCA-based ratings as a covariate
in an ANCOVA with motive information and statement version
as between-subject factors and veracity ratings as the dependent
variable. We assumed that by introducing CBCA-based ratings
into the model, the effect of statement quality on veracity
judgments (see above) would no longer be statistically significant.
This would suggest a mediation effect of CBCA-based ratings
on veracity judgments (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Indeed, we
found no statistically significant effect of statement quality,
F(1, 290) = 0.55, p = 0.58; ηp2 = 0.001, and 95% CI (0, 0.02),
whereas the model’s covariate CBCA-based ratings had a large
effect, F(1, 296) = 83.13, p < 0.01; ηp2 = 0.22, and 95% CI (0.14,
0.29). We concluded that participants generally included their
CBCA-based ratings in their veracity judgments.
DISCUSSION
The present study investigated how information on a possible
motive to lie affects judgments of witness statements. The current
data did not support our assumption that information on a
motive to lie would influence the perceived content quality
as measured by CBCA-based ratings; we found only a very
small main effect that was not statistically significant. Instead,
CBCA-based ratings were influenced largely by the constructed
content quality of the statement itself, with participants
differentiating the three statement versions according to their
content characteristics. Thus, participants across all conditions
correctly identified the varying content quality of the statements.
However, compared to controls, we found the predicted
decrease in veracity ratings in participants who were given
information suggesting a motive to lie. Notably, this decrease
was found when rating statements not only of medium but also
of low content quality: The relative frequency of truth ratings
decreased from 88% to just above 50%, which can be regarded
as a meaningful effect. In contrast, we did not find the assumed
effect for participants provided with information suggesting that
there is no motive to lie: Their veracity ratings generally did
not differ from those of controls. These results correspond with
those of the manipulation check: Here, participants in the control
and the no-motive-to-lie groups also did not differ in whether
they said that the witness had a motive to lie. However, there
was a large difference to the motive-to-lie group who reported
having assumed a motive to lie. Thus, even though participants
from all conditions correctly identified the differences between
the statements regarding content quality, this content quality
apparently influenced only the veracity ratings of those with
information on a motive to lie: They judged statements of
medium and low quality less often as true than statements
of high quality.
In general, our findings contradicted those of Bogaard
et al. (2014). They reported that both “positive” and “negative”
information affected CBCA and veracity ratings, whereas in
the current study, there was only an effect on veracity ratings.
Furthermore, this was only the case for “negative” information—
that is, information suggesting a motive to lie. However, Bogaard
et al. (2014) did not vary statement versions systematically,
presented various pieces of contextual information with rather
general implications, and aggregated ratings on different types
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of offenses. In the current study, we investigated the effect of
different statement versions, presented case-specific information
on a motive to lie, and focused on sexual harassment at work. This
makes the two studies difficult to compare. Moreover, Bogaard
et al. (2014) did not include a control group as a baseline.
Hence, strictly speaking, their data cannot distinguish between
the effects of their two information conditions. Thus, the effect
they reported might be driven by either “positive” information,
“negative” information (as in the present study), or both. Hence,
the results of both studies—although different at first glance—
might actually be compatible.
The CBCA-Based Short Scale as a
Measure for Perceived Content Quality
In the current study, participants rated the content quality of
the three statement versions on a CBCA-based short scale.
Even though they had not undergone any specific introduction
or training, their overall content quality ratings reflected the
constructed quality differences between the statement versions.
Moreover, participants included their CBCA-based ratings in
their veracity judgments (but see limitations section). However,
as already pointed out, the CBCA-based scale was constructed in
order to measure the perceived content quality based on group
statistics. This study did not intend to test whether it distinguishes
validly between experience-based and fabricated statements as
the original CBCA scale has been shown to do. Nonetheless, the
current results do underline its potential as a comprehensible
and short instrument for CBCA research with laypersons that
does not require extensive rating training. More studies need to
vary statements and their criteria-related content systematically
in order to develop a reliable and valid short version of the
CBCA. For example, word count could not be ruled out as a
possible confounder for content quality in the current sample.
Given sufficient validity of a CBCA-based short scale, however,
it might one day be a handy research instrument to use when
either extensive rater training is not possible or expert raters
are not available.
The Present Veracity Rating Results Are
Compatible With Truth-Default Theory
Overall, it was especially the lack of differences between the
no-motive-to-lie group and controls that were not in line with
our hypotheses. However, a closer examination of the literature
reveals that the whole pattern of results fits in well with TDT
(Levine, 2014). TDT assumes that most human communication
is honest (“truth bias,” see also Burgoon et al., 1995). Thus, as
a default, people should (correctly) presume that others tell the
truth until they have good reason to think otherwise (Levine,
2014). Hence, TDT generally predicts a strong truth bias when
judging statements on sexual harassment, and that this should
decrease only when a motive to lie is perceived (projected
motive model; see also Levine et al., 2010). This is exactly what
we observed in the current study: Most participants with no
further contextual information judged all three statements to be
truthful. Based on TDT and other theoretical work (Burgoon
et al., 1995), it can be assumed that they did so because they
had no reason to be suspicious (see also Millar and Millar,
1997). Providing information suggesting a motive to lie, however,
probably induced suspicion. Hence, it had the predicted effect
of generally decreasing veracity judgments. Nonetheless, this
effect occurred only when the statement quality was not too
high. If statement quality was high, veracity ratings were also
high, even when provided with information on a motive to
lie. In line with TDT, this suggests that information on a
motive to lie led participants to process the statements and
their characteristics more carefully (Levine et al., 2010; see also
Millar and Millar, 1997, 1998).
From a TDT point of view, it is also no surprise that we did not
find the predicted difference in veracity ratings between controls
and the no-motive-to-lie group. This was probably because the
no-motive-to-lie group was provided only with information
suggesting that there was simply no reason to assume a motive to
lie. As already explained above, TDT expects this to be the general
default anyway. Thus, according to TDT, it was not very likely
that the no-motive-to-lie manipulation as conceptualized here
would induce differences to the control group in the first place.
Future studies might therefore include stronger manipulations
for a no-motive-to-lie group. For example, Levine et al. (2010)
used confessions to committing a crime (in which a motive to lie
seems extremely unlikely) that are probably better suited to elicit
differences between a no-motive-to-lie and control conditions.
To conclude, the current pattern of results is quite compatible
with the theoretical framework of TDT. This is especially the case
for the lack of differences between the no-motive-to-lie group
and the control group. However, because our considerations
regarding the latter findings are post hoc considerations,
replication studies need to test them as explicit hypotheses.
Dual Process Theories of Social
Judgment – Did Information on a Motive
to Lie Induce Systematic Rather Than
Heuristic Processing?
Dual-process theories have suggested two modes of information
processing in social judgment tasks: one that involves attempts
to thoroughly understand the available information (systematic
processing) and another that involves focusing on salient and
easily comprehendible cues activating well-learned judgmental
shortcuts (heuristic processing; for an overview see Chaiken
and Ledgerwood, 2012). Reinhard and Sporer (2008, 2010)
showed that dual-process theories can also be used to understand
credibility judgments. In the current study, information on
a motive to lie caused participants to include verbal content
(ratings) of the statements in their veracity judgments. This
was neither the case in the control group nor the no-motive-
to-lie group. In these conditions, participants appeared to
base their decisions merely on motive information, that is,
heuristic processing. Information on a motive to lie may
therefore have induced systematic processing of the verbal
content information. However, work on dual-process theories
has stressed that systematic processing requires motivational and
cognitive involvement. If this involvement is missing, heuristic
processing is preferred (Reinhard and Sporer, 2010). Nonetheless,
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cognitive and/or motivational involvement was not manipulated
in this study and yet differences in information processing
between the motive groups were found. Possibly, information
on a motive to lie and the incriminating information contained
in the statement may have been perceived as incongruent.
Information incongruence has been shown to result in primarily
systematic information processing (Chaiken and Maheswaran,
1994). However, when a verbal message is ambiguous, systematic
processing of its content appears to be influenced or biased
by heuristic processing as well. Thus, both systematic and
heuristic processing play a role when ambiguous messages
are processed. This is in line with our finding that the
effect of a motive to lie was greatest when statements of
medium, that is, ambiguous quality were judged. To conclude,
dual-process theories on social judgments provide a fruitful
theoretical approach in order to understand the processes
which drive the effects of contextual information on credibility
judgments. More research is required to disentangle possible
effects of cognitive/motivational involvement and information
incongruence on information processing, when information on
a motive to lie is provided.
Information on a Motive to Lie Shifted
the Focus to Content Quality: A
Distortion or an Improvement of
Judgment?
Given that experts using CBCA in the field are always
confronted with contextual information, the question arises
whether this might have negative or positive effects on CBCA
and credibility evaluations. As already pointed out above, our
results suggest that information on a motive to lie might
influence judgments by changing how raters come to a decision.
Motive information apparently made them include content
quality in their veracity ratings; when no lie suspicion was
induced by motive information, participants’ ratings indicated
a truth bias across the different statement versions. In other
words, participants who were not suspicious ignored the different
statement characteristics, whereas participants confronted with
information suggesting that there is a motive to lie focused on
content quality. This rather speaks against a distortive effect of
motive information on veracity judgment. After all, given that
true statements have been shown to generally contain more
CBCA criteria than fabricated statements (see, e.g., Oberlader
et al., 2016), it appears to be the preferable strategy to take the
statement quality into account in the judgment rather than to
leave it aside. In addition, according to psychological theories,
people do indeed usually lie for a reason—that is, when they
have a motive to lie. Apart from TDT (see above), activation-
decision-construction-action theory (ADCAT, Walczyk et al.,
2014)—a comprehensive theoretical framework on the whole
process of lying—assumes that people will lie only when it is
necessary in order to attain personal goals. Therefore, the current
results raise the question whether information on a motive to
lie might even improve statement judgments, because it raises
reasonable doubts and moves possibly relevant information into
the focus of attention. However, whether a motive to lie actually
affects judgment accuracy is an open empirical question that
will require more studies that vary the veracity status of the
statements to be judged. It would also be helpful to learn more
about the prevalence of a motive to lie in both true and false
allegations in the field.
Limitations
Some limitations should be noted: To begin with, as already
elaborated above, the no-motive-to-lie manipulation was
probably not strong enough to elicit judgment differences
compared to controls. Also, we did not use the original CBCA
taxonomy to assess content quality, and our sample consisted of
university students largely unfamiliar with credibility assessment
tools. Thus, the current study is rather a study of how laypeople
do credibility assessment in everyday life. Referring to dual-
process theories depicted above, experts on credibility assessment
might rely more on systematic processing of verbal information
instead of heuristic processing. The effects of information on
a motive to lie might therefore be different in a sample of
experts. Furthermore, recent works have pointed out that in
order to achieve sufficient power (∼80%) to detect attenuated
interactions, larger sample sizes are usually needed that exceed
the current one (Blake and Gangestad, 2020). Future studies
might therefore collect larger sample sizes to reduce possible
type-II errors and obtain more robust effects. In addition,
the relatively low alpha of the CBCA-based short scale has
the implication that the effects found might be lower bound
estimates of the actual effects, attenuated by relatively low
reliability. However, there is empirical work which suggests that
test-retest correlations are much more important for a test score’s
criterion validity than internal consistency estimates (McCrae
et al., 2011). Consequently, future studies should also explore the
stability of scores from the here proposed short scale. Finally,
this study cannot state whether information on a motive to lie
does indeed improve or impair judgments in the field. This
question will require more studies directly assessing the impact
of information on a motive to lie on judgment accuracy.
CONCLUSION
Our findings imply that people overcome the typically found
truth bias when they are provided with information about a
motive to lie. In this situation, they take content characteristics
of the relevant statement into account when judging its
veracity. Thus, information on a motive to lie might have
a positive effect on decision making. Future research should
test the effect of information on a motive to lie in a sample
consisting of CBCA experts, use the original CBCA taxonomy,
and investigate the impact of varying motive information on
judgment accuracy in the field.
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APPENDIX 1
Construction of the CBCA-Based Rating Scale
We constructed five CBCA-based items. First, with “quantity of details” and “vividness of event,” we included two criteria referring
to basic episodic memory characteristics associated with the truthfulness of an account (Volbert and Steller, 2014; Volbert, 2015)
that should be comprehensible for laypersons. Quantity of details was transformed into the item “How detailed would you rate this
statement? That is, are persons, things, places, events, and actions depicted in detail?” (originally in German). Participants rated this
item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not detailed at all) to 5 (very detailed). “Vividness of the event” was transformed into the item
“Does the statement draw a vivid and illustrative picture of the events?” (originally in German). Again, participants were asked for
ratings on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not vivid at all) to 5 (very vivid).
Second, we included CBCA criteria generally based on script-deviant information such as unexpected complications, unusual
details, or irrelevant details (Volbert and Steller, 2014; Volbert, 2015). The underlying idea is that liars rely on general script
information when constructing a lie (Steller and Köhnken, 1989). This is why details deviating from general script information are
assumed to occur in true accounts while being less likely in fabricated statements. The corresponding item had to depict the main idea
behind script-deviant details; but, at the same time, it had to be understandable for laypersons. Hence, we asked participants “Does
the description appear to you to be schematic and limited to information directly related to the allegation, or does the description
contain rather plastic details that go beyond a mere description of the allegation?” (originally German). Participants were again asked
for ratings on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (very schematic, limited to the offense) to 5 (very plastic, beyond the offense).
Third, we included criteria based on indications of a lack of strategic self-presentation that are supposed to occur when telling
the truth but not when lying (Steller and Köhnken, 1989; Volbert and Steller, 2014). Recently, lack of strategic self-presentation
has been subdivided into memory-related shortcomings and other problematic content/motivation-related content (Volbert, 2015).
Memory-related shortcomings include criteria such as spontaneous corrections, efforts to remember, or admitting lack of memory.
These are criteria that liars usually try to avoid in order to appear confident and convincing (Maier et al., 2018). We asked
participants “To what extent does the statement contain indications of spontaneous memory retrieval (e.g., insecurities, spontaneous
supplementing/corrections, or admitting lack of memory)?” (originally in German). Participants were again asked for ratings on a
5-point scale ranging from 1 (no indications of memory retrieval at all) to 5 (indications of memory retrieval strongly pronounced).
Other problematic content mainly includes lack of incrimination, that is, pardoning the perpetrator and self-deprecation (Volbert,
2015). These criteria were formerly labeled motivation-related content by Steller and Köhnken (1989). We asked “To what extent does
the statement contain indications for a particular intention of Ms. K. to incriminate Mr. H.?” (originally in German). Participants
had to rate this item on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (there was no incrimination tendency) to 5 (there was a strong incrimination
tendency). Because within the context of CBCA, a low incrimination tendency is associated with a higher credibility, this item was
reversed compared to the other items.
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